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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
BACKGROUND AND OUTLINE OF RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
 
The issue of humanitarian intervention has generated a lot of controversies, especially in 
Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Rwanda. Wheeler (2001) and Mertus (2000) have tried to discuss 
and debate humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine. Since the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in Kosovo, human rights lawyers have tried 
to get the international community to focus on Kosovo. There were reports of systematic human 
rights abuses in the region. The perpetrators of the crimes were Serb citizens and Serb police 
(Mertus, 2000). These violations of human rights were directed to the Albanians. By then, 
violence was alarming and forced deportations were imminent. There was a need for the 
international community to take preventative measures as grave human rights violations were 
imminent, however; leaders did not treat Kosovo with the urgency it deserved. This forced the 
Albanians to abandon passive resistance and to opt for armed resistance (Mertus, 2000). In 1998 
Serb forces killed about fifty four Albanians in response to the Kosovo Liberation Army‟s 
 (KLA) provocation. All this did not provoke the international leaders to intervene. It was only at 
the later stage that international community started focusing in Kosovo (Mertus, 2000). 
 
Currently, the international law outlaws the breach of human rights and humanitarian law 
orchestrated by state against its citizens. Every state has the responsibility to respond to these 
breaches individually and collectively. Such responses ought to be non-forcible (Dana, 2000). A 
variety of nongovernmental organizations can be part of fighting such violations. However, the 
intervention in Kosovo by NATO forces raised controversy with regard to the permissibility of 





was part in Kosovo issue for quite some time. Before the air strikes, it had already adopted three 
resolutions in line with Chapter VII (Dana, 2000). The resolutions laid a foundation for the 
program of action which authorized the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) to put in place an observer force, the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) in Kosovo to 
monitor the situation. The resolutions further called upon the Former Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY), the KLA, and all other states and organizations to stop using force and called for a stop in 
violations of human rights. By no means have the resolutions authorized the use of force by any 
external actor. Instead they reaffirmed the importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
the FRY. At that point no foreign actor had an authority to use force (Dana, 2000). 
 
This  research  project  is  aimed  at  giving  an  insight  on  the  NATO‟s  intervention  in  Kosovo  in 
 
1999, and will examine how that has impacted on the law of international humanitarian 
intervention. It will reconcile the legality of intervention in line with both international 
customary law and the United Nations (UN) Charter which clearly stipulates that “all members 
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
 
Purposes of the United Nations” (Hatley, 2010:65). 
 
 
Schabas in Hatley (2010) suggested that the Kosovo intervention was necessary to prevent an 
impending humanitarian catastrophe while others maintained that it was illegal. The intervention 
was so controversial because it was the first time since the founding of the UN that a group of 
states acted without explicit Security Council‟s authority to defend a breach of the sovereignty 








The international reactions to NATO‟s intervention were mixed: on one hand, it was welcomed 
by scholars who argued that the threat or use of the veto in the Security Council cannot be 
allowed to stand in the way of the defense of human rights. Some supported this position on the 
grounds that morality should supersede legality in exceptional cases where governments commit 
massive violations of human rights inside their borders (Donnelly, 2003). For this group, the 
international law should not be changed to accommodate the practice of humanitarian 
intervention because this would be open for abuse. Others argued that NATO‟s action was legal 
because it represented the development of international customary law through state practice. On 
the other hand, states like Russia, China and India strongly opposed the claim that NATO‟s 
action was lawful and argued that humanitarian intervention without Security Council‟s authority 
jeopardizes the foundations of international order and that a single event cannot develop the 
international customary law (Donnelly, 2003). 
 
AIMS OF THE STUDY 
 
 
This research project seeks to explore the changing normative context of humanitarian 
intervention in the international relations as a result of Kosovo. It will do so by examining the 
effect of the Kosovo intervention by the NATO forces in 1999. It will assess the claim first made 
by Jonathan Charney that the Kosovo intervention laid the precedent for changing the 
international law. The legal and moral justifications of unilateral intervention will be assessed by 
this research project. The dilemma between violation of human rights and the use of force 
outside the UN consent will be highlighted. It will also determine whether unilateral intervention 
can be justified on humanitarian grounds. 
 
The   research   project   will   claim   that   the   NATO‟s   intervention   in   Kosovo    revealed   the 
 




intervention was morally just given the then violation on human rights, but it created a bad 
precedent and if that precedent is followed, then it likely to leave the room for superpowers to 





The research project will use constructivism approach to enhance the understanding of normative 
context of humanitarian intervention. These theorists negate the dominant traditional 
understanding of the international relations theory that states‟ interest and those of other actors 
are formed independent of society‟s interaction (Finnemore, 1996). They suggest that identity 
formation is relational and prior to interest formation. Interests are understood in two terms, 
material and non-material. Consequently, they focus on the role that culture, institutions and 
norms play in shaping identity and behavior. The idea is that there is an absence of a 
supranational authority; as a result norms dictate the behavior of a state. It is worth noting that 
according to the constructivists, ideas, norms including rules are not courses but justifications for 
the behavior (Finnemore, 1996). 
 




Defining humanitarian intervention is no easy task as it is highly contested by and among 
commentators and political scientists in international relations. It is generally accepted that it 
refers to outside military interference by a state or group of states in the domestic affairs of 
another state in order to pursue humanitarian principles (Oxford Dictionary of Law, 1997). 
Verey (1985) notes that, if present there are few concepts which are as complex as humanitarian 







on the legal meaning of intervention and of humanitarianism. Despite that, certain standard 




Firstly, it is the violation of the sovereignty of the country in which intervention is taking place 
(Rostow, 1971). Sovereignty implies the legal independence of a state in international relations. 
 
Rostow notes that “The formal structure of the international state system is built on the principle 
that each state is autonomous and independent, and has the right in its internal affairs to be free 
from acts of coercion committed or assisted by other states. This rule is basic to the possibility of 
international law” (1971:15). Internally, it refers to the prerogative of a state to make laws and 
implement them. Externally, it refers to the idea that all states are equal in the international arena 
and that no state can compel the other to do anything it would have not preferred (Mastanduno, 
1995). The major problem with regard to humanitarian intervention is imbedded in the breach of 
sovereignty and thus arise the question of supremacy between the two principles. This seeks to 
suggest that any form of humanitarian intervention by state or group of states on invitation by the 
host state is excluded here since it not hostile towards sovereignty. Secondly, the utilization of 
armed personnel in intervention is central. This excludes a variety of interpretations of 
intervention as a concept, which is inclusive of political and economic interference with a state‟s 




Thirdly, the concept of humanitarian intervention includes the large scale violation of human 
rights. Donnelly asserts that “human rights are ordinarily understood as the rights one has simply 
because one is a human being. Furthermore, a concept of gross human rights violations must 





(1995: 24). One scholar Lauterpacht correctly captured that a “state renders itself guilty of 
cruelties against persecution of its nationals in such a way as to deny their fundamental rights 
and to shock the conscience of mankind” (1955:36). Interventions which are not carried out on 
the basis of humanitarianism must be omitted. However, the prerequisite should be that the 
intervention is intended to effect humanitarian conduct of the state in question and that the 
intervener will not be benefiting from the action. Also it must be aimed at preventing grave 
human rights violations. Lastly, humanitarian intervention is a legal issue; therefore it should be 









THE LAW OF NATURE 
 
With the emergence of western culture (384-322 BC) philosophers in Greece started arguing that 
there is a universal law of nature which abides all humankind and is supreme to all positive laws 
 
(Crisp, 2000). Aristotle in Crisp came up with key proposition that “One part of what is 
politically just is natural, and the other part legal. What is natural is what has the same validity 
everywhere alike” (2000: 34). At a later stage Stoicists developed this into a proper theory of the 
Law of Nature. Natural law was seen as being founded on the structure of the universe. This 
means that the law of nature is universally applicable to all people. This law serves as the 
foundation for a number of moral and legal principles (Crisp, 2000). Since it advocated for 








nature served as a foundation for social contract and states sovereignty. As a result, it is the 






The humanitarian intervention doctrine is largely grounded in the just war theory. In ancient 
Greece, war could only be justified if there was a just cause for it (Mushkat, 1986). Christian 
churches were pacific not allowing any form of justification for war. It was St. Augustine who 
started to admit that war could be justified on just cause (Mushkat, 1986). In an attempt to bridge 
the gap between the Christians‟ position and the real political environment, he came up with 
some procedures that were aimed at making war to be justified in some cases. Just like Christian 
moral theory, his theory evolved around just cause and intention. “The justness of an action 
could not be judged without evaluating the driving intention, so also with the state action of 
going to war” (Mushkat, 1986: 26). As the Christian church extended it influence just war theory 




Through the amalgamation of ancient Greece, Aristotle and Christian church writings, St. 
Thomas Aquinas came with his conclusion. He concluded that there is no overall condemnation 
of war, but it should be a just war. In order for war to be just it has to pass the following 
requirements: the war should be authorized by proper authorities. There should be valid reasons 
and need to wage war. That need is usually based on self-defense; attempts to restore peace; 
defense of the helpless and in helping the neighbor who‟s under attack. Also it should be waged 








Hugo Grotius is said to be the one who separated the law of nature from God. Although he did 
not exclusively reject the existence of God he did not use him as an explanatory factor. He 
expanded on Aristotle‟s rule that people are social beings. He proposed that people strive to live 
in a peaceful environment and in harmony with other beings. He held that individual beings and 
their natural rights are the center of law (Freeman, 1994). The central values of good faith apply 
to every being despite nationality and status. He claimed that in case of violation of individual‟s 
fundamental rights the larger community has the right to use force in defense of that individual. 
He applied natural law to international law; his Law of Nations was developed from his Law on 
Nature. He argued that the nation-states were constructed in order to improve security. Individual 





In the case of the state which violates fundamental human rights of it citizens that state is 
deemed to have breached its jurisdiction, as a result other states are entitled to intervene to 
restore the order of the Law of Nature. Grotius held that “Certainly it is undoubted that ever 
since civil societies were formed, the rulers of each claimed some special rights over his 
subjects. [But] .if a tyrant practices atrocities towards his subjects, which no just man can 
approve, the right of human social connexion is not cut off in such a case. It would not follow 
that others may not take up arms for them” (Freeman, 1994: 54). It was Grotius‟ position that 
made Lauterpacht to suggest that he (Grotius) was that first person to come out and claim the 
existence of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention meant that 
domestic jurisdiction ends when atrocity against people begins. Grotius then came with the 





(Freeman, 1994). For example the attack on non-combatants and unnecessary destruction of 
enemy‟s properties is totally prohibited. The custodians of natural law suggested that 
humanitarian intervention conforms to the Law of Nature. The wars were not totally banned but 





This research project requires a qualitative method. It will be based on secondary sources. In line 
with Creswell (2003) who acknowledged that qualitative research is used in various academic 
disciplines but it was traditionally used in social sciences. Qualitative researchers strive to get a 
thorough understanding of human behavior and the rationale behind it. This approach is more 
suitable as the study seeks to understand the decision by NATO to invade Kosovo outside the 
U.N. authority. Mainly it seeks to assess the response by states and individuals in the 
international arena. It explores every detail of the decision making and usually a smaller sample 
is required. This research project is aimed at understanding the changing behavior of states in 
relation to humanitarian intervention. Qualitative research has several meanings, for example, the 
term can be used interchangeably with the terms such as naturalistic, ethnographic, subjective, 
and post-positivistic. According to Wolcott (1990), qualitative research is geared towards 




For the purpose of data collection, secondary sources will be mostly used to get an insight on the 
theories which have been used to explain the change of norms and behavior in the international 








natural settings trying to make sense of them (Wolcott, 1990). In this research project the 




































































Due to the fact that humanitarian intervention has been studied comprehensively in international 
relations, it is necessary to focus on the impact of NATO‟s intervention in Kosovo. Before 
executing such a task, this chapter deals with theoretical approaches in the international relations: 
idealism, neorealism, pluralism and constructivism respectively. Their perceptions are not 
mutually exclusive in assessing humanitarian intervention but their justifications are different. It 
is suggested in this chapter that above all, constructivism offers the most convincing account for 
humanitarian intervention because it allows us to understand different moral and legal discourses 





The Idealist school of thought starts from the premise that the conventional approach is failing to 
explain the incidences in the international system since it only explains them in military terms. 
Brand-Jacobsen in Baldwin contends that “unless the international community comes up with 
new ways of addressing security concerns and to transcend the limitations inherent in traditional 
conception of security and inter and intra-state relations, the current status of unauthorized use of 
force will continue (Baldwin, 1993:16). This owes to the fact that scourges are not only present 
in military but everywhere and they do threaten security. 
 
The point of departure stems from the perception that humans by nature are cooperative. The 
implication for this is very important in analyzing why wars occur and what the society must do 
to prevent them. This view holds that natural harmony exists among human beings; as a result 




the evil institutions which upset harmony and order among people (Hanlon, 2008). The central 
duty is to identify and restructure these evil institutions to avoid war. 
 
According to Woodrow Wilson, international peace can be assured by means of the 
establishment of an international structure similar to the League of Nations to control anarchy. 
Such a structure would allow for diplomatic processes to take place and protect states from 
outside hostility (Hanlon, 2008). Post Second World War, the UN adopted the principle of 






The Neorealist school of thought was first coined by Kenneth Waltz in his book International 
Politics in 1979. It was an attempt to modify and update realism theory. Waltz argued that the 
international system is an anarchic system which lacks central authority to regulate states‟ 
relations (Waltz, 1979). International politics is as a result of systemic nature as opposed to 
human nature. States are eager to pursue their personal gains and they act according to their 
interests. Even if states join alliances they do so to further pursue their interests even inside the 
alliances. He holds that due to security concerns states are always competing with one another. 
Power is important in understanding interactions among states (Waltz, 1979). In the international 
system the stronger the state, the less vulnerable it is. Neorealism states that the only way to 
maintain peace is by maximizing power. He holds that “A state having too much power may 
scare other states into uniting against it and thus become less secure. A state having too little 







As said Neorealism was a modification of Realism. Scholars of Realist school of thought hold 
that national interests, power and state survival are central in analyzing states‟ relations. They 
held that when states‟ interests are troubled, states ought to act under the code of responsibility. 
This rule is usually used to justify violation of the rules of war. It has the roots on Thucydides‟ 
account of the Peloponnesian War and also in Sun Tzu‟s Art of War (Waltz, 2004). Thucydides 
noted that “In a world where no superordinate or central authority exists to impose order, the 
strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” (Waltz, 
 
2004:2) . A number of realism advocates hold that national security can be better attained 
through application of realist theory. 
 
Georg Schwarzenberger also shares Thucydides‟ view on international system “In the absence of 
genuine international community…groups within the international system can be expected to do 





Due to the fact that realist school of thought sees the international system an anarchic, it is clear 
that the intervening states subscribe to this approach. This view is shared by modern neorealist as 
Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer (Waltz, 2004). They argue that the absence of central 
government in the international system necessitates that states rely on their own power for safety. 
Deducting from the importance of power, Morgenthau deducts that “a political policy seeks 
either to keep power, or to increase power, or to demonstrate power” (Waltz, 2004: 6). Such 











Pluralism is used mainly in both fields of international relations and political science. It criticizes 
the traditional notion of security studies by asserting that, instead of focusing on security and 
development, it is of importance to realize that there are a variety of securities and developments 
(Kauppi & Viotti, 1998). What is security to one could be the total opposite of security to the 
other. Due to that understanding the pluralists hold that “to seek to impose one view or one 
understanding upon those who do not support or share that view may in itself be conflict 
provoking and engendering, promoting insecurity and destabilization rather than security” 
 
(Kauppi & Viotti, 1998:24). These scholars believe that cooperation among states is important in 
assuring the secure environment. As a result, instead of states being skeptical of one another it is 
important that they work together to find amicable solutions addressing the root causes of 
conflict that provoke insecurity (Kauppi & Viotti, 1998). For pluralists, cooperation and peaceful 
means are vital in addressing a number of shortfalls of the traditional notion of security. 
 
Pluralists oppose the belief that the state is the major player in international relations. In doing 
so, they assert that there is a lot of interaction taking place outside the state (Brown, 2001). They 
forward a number of reasons to prove that the traditional approach to international relations is 
flawed. They do recognize the central role of the state; however, they hold that “states are 
important, for they set rules of the economic, communications, technology, and other games that 
occur simultaneously. But by themselves, they do not set the international agenda, nor can they 
make decisions as if removed from the interests, values, and aspirations of millions of business 
firms, banks, shipping companies, political parties, citizens groups, and the like” (Bull, 1984:18). 
 
State is recognized as one among the actors in the pluralist environment. For that reason, they 
are essentially against the traditional principle of sovereignty as embraced by Thomas Hobbes 




The pluralist scholars reject the idea that state is absolute. They argue that it is inappropriate to 
disregard the role played by non-state actors like rebel movements (Brown, 2001). These non-
state actors have massive influence in determining which issues are of importance and which are 
of none. They point out that states are entering into treaties with international and regional 
bodies. Accordingly, such treaties have binding status which cannot be breached. They submit 
that, for the improvement of international relations it is important to abandon the notion of 
absolute sovereignty and it effects (Brown, 2001). 
 
Regardless of pluralists‟ assumption, sovereignty remains at the center of political reality. Due to 
the fact that state legislate rules it follows that they have the prerogative to unmake or amend 
them to suite their will regardless of it correctness or lack thereof (Kauppi & Viotti, 1998). State 
has the ability to breach treaties. It is a common knowledge that intervening states are signatories 





Among key challenges facing the international relations theorists today is to explain the major 
political changes in the arena. The end of Cold War presented new dynamics and challenges to 
the existing and dominant analytical frameworks: neo- realism and idealism, respectively 
(Finnemore, 1996). This situation opened the vacuum which was subsequently occupied by the 
emergence of the new wave, the constructivists. These theorists negate the dominant traditional 
understanding of the international relations theory that states‟ interest and those of other actors 
are formed independent of society‟s interaction (Finnemore, 1996). They suggest that identity 
formation is relational and prior to interest formation. Interests are understood in two terms, 





norms play in shaping identity and behavior. The idea is that there is an absence of a 
supranational authority; as a result norms dictate the behavior of a state. It is worth noting that 
according to the constructivists, ideas, norms including rules are not causes but justifications for 
the behavior (Finnemore, 1996). 
 
The constructivist theorists concentrate on human awareness and its position in international 
affairs. Most of international relations theories, neorealism in particular is materialistic. It 
suggests that material power: military capabilities and economic power in the international arena 
offers the explanation with regard to state‟ behavior. Scholars of constructivist school reject this 
claim on bases that it is one sided as it only focuses on material. They claim that the most crucial 
feature of international relations is not material but social (Wendt, 1999). The social and political 
world inclusive of international relations is not just physical object exclusive of human 
awareness. As a result the study of international relations ought to put attention on ideas and 
beliefs as they dictate state behavior. The international system is not immune from human 
interaction since it does not exist in isolation. If the ideas and norms that inform the position in 
international relation changes so the system itself changes. This is the basis for Alexander 
 
Wendt‟s (1992) assertion that anarchy is what states make of it. 
 
 
Since constructivists discard arguments by neo-realists with regard to the nexus between state of 
anarchy and states‟ behavior in international relations including materialism, identities and 
interests emerge as fundamental aspects in studying international relations. Given that states are 
not constrained under the self-help arrangement, interests and identities shape their behavior. In 
line with the international order, constructivism sees identities and interests as the outcome of 
social construction and not based on materialism. In essence, the ideas, objects and actors are all 




Wendt (1992) forwarded an argument rejecting neo-realists‟ position that state of anarchy 
compels state to play competitive power politics. He argued that power politics if it exists is as a 
result of process rather than state of anarchy. State identities and interests are established and 
altered within the framework of international arena and not existing exogenous variables. 
Identities by nature are relational; as a result states can have various identities e.g. sovereign and 
imperial power, depending on the type of interaction it enjoys with others (Wendt, 1992). 
Identities serve as the foundation for interests. States have no single universal identity of being a 
super power exclusive of social context as neo-realist would suggest. The interaction of 
international actors determines interests and not the structure of the system. Foreign policy 
identities and interests are informed by the international system. Constant social interaction of 
state A with state B creates mutual expectations about future behavior, thereafter, identities and 
interests emerge (Wendt, 1992). 
 
In comparison to conventional approaches in international relations constructivism gives a 
compelling analysis of humanitarian intervention. It does so by introducing human 
consciousness, national identity and interest formation. The change of behavior in relation to 
humanitarian intervention is congruent to the changes of normative standards. It is these norms 
which dictate who worth humanitarian intervention and the modus operandi in implementation 
also changes accordingly. The pattern of intervention cannot be understood apart from the 
changing normative context in which it occurs. The failure of alternative explanations to account 















The issue of humanitarian intervention relates to two aspects in the international arena, 
international law and morality respectively. International law embodies non-intervention 
principle and state sovereignty while morality embodies human right protections (Ayoob, 2001). 
It is generally argued that morality is excluded in the formation of the international law. And 
such international law excludes the authorization of intervention based on humanitarianism. With 
the end of Cold War a new normative dimension has emerged which allows the Security Council 
to authorise interventions on humanitarian grounds like in Somalia. The intervention on 
humanitarian grounds either it protect the civilians from persecution or force the government to 




There are number of perspectives in engaging on justifications of interventions: legal, moral and 
political. However, the current debate on intervention is largely based on legal and moral 
justifications (Jackson, 1990). The legal aspect is important in determining how far the law 
allows for the violation of both codified and customary rights of sovereign states in defence of 
humanitarian interventions. Morality relates to the moral principles which can be evoked in order 
to legitimize the breach of sovereignty on the state (Goldsmith, 2005). With regard to political 
approach, there are minimal chances for this justification, however; it is central to take into 
account the fact that motives behind interventions are most likely to be political. In addition to 











The comparison between international law and domestic law usually shows the inadequacy as 
the two are different. They are different in a sense that: international law lacks single 
authoritative legislator; it shorts of presiding officer who interprets the law and who is above all 
states in terms of authority; customs are equally important as treaties and lastly, it is 
underdeveloped. The international law is derived from two major sources, treaties and customary 




Treaties and conventions come in the form of quasi documented agreements between and among 
states. Their interpretations are in accordance with the agreed upon guidelines or general 
guidelines as set out in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Customary 
international law comes from states‟ practice coupled by opinion juris (Farer, 2003).This is the 
states‟ belief that they are required by law to follow that practice. Usually treaties have a weight 




Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter stipulates “all members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” This 
prohibition generally applies to all subjects of international law. It is not limited to the UN 




Article 2 (4) is further strengthen by article 2 (7) which out –laws any intervention by the UN in 





Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” The legitimacy of the Security Council to use or 
sanction the use of force derived from article 39 “The Security Council shall determine the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, 
to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Adding to these provisions, Chapter 
 
VIII Article 51 allows for the application of force in self-defence, individual or collective 
defence. Article 53 further allows the Security Council to utilize regional organizations 
accordingly or to give authority to them to apply force (Lyons, 1995). 
 
The general prohibition of intervention with an exception in rare circumstances is backed by the 
United Nations General Assembly. The 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention 
stated that “no state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any 
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any state” (Chesterman, 2004). In the 1970 
Declaration on Principals of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co‐operation 
among States, the General Assembly again interpreted the Charter as meaning “no state or group 
of states has the right to intervene in any form or for any reason whatsoever in the internal or 
external affairs of any state”. The 1981 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and 
 
Interference in the Internal Affairs of States and the 1993 review of the implementation of the 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention on the Strengthening of International Security 
both again called upon states to refrain from the use of force, aggression, intervention and 




envisioned in the Charter (Chesterman, 2004). The Assembly has, according to Michael 
Glennon, constructed a rule of invalidity with respect to intervention. The rule admits no 
exception. Thus, there is a line taken by the UN General Assembly that maintains that 
intervention is always unlawful, regardless of the state undertaking intervention, and regardless 




As much as humanitarian intervention is not explicitly singled out, there is a general consensus 
that the Security Council is entrusted with the responsibility to intervene on humanitarian 
grounds or authorizes such an action under Chapter VIII of the Charter (Chesterman, 2004). The 
base for such authority is Article 39 which entrust the Security Council with the duty to 
 
“determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression, and 
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures are to be taken in accordance with 
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain and restore international peace and security.” In the post-Cold 
 
War, the Security Council have begun interpreting the phrase “threat to peace” differently. It has 
acknowledged that humanitarian catastrophe especially in collapsed states might have splits over 
effects. The issue is can really humanitarian catastrophe be regarded as threat to peace. The 
response is simple, Article 39 reads “the Security Council shall determine” the existence of a 
threat to peace. Then the prerogative to decide what constitutes threat to peace rests on the 
Security Council (Chesterman, 2004). 
 
 
“As the international community has not criticised or opposed humanitarian interventions under 
 
Chapter VII authorisations, they are arguably lawful modifications of the treaty through practice. The 




influenced by practice” (Jackson, 1990:54). Despite the absence of well documented authority, 
currently the Security Council is seen as the legitimate body to authorize humanitarian 
intervention through allied forces or regional organizations. The one part of the Charter which 
seems to be outlawing humanitarian intervention is Article 2 (7). It prohibits the UN from 
intervening in domestic affairs of any given state (Jackson, 1990). What is problematic it that the 
same Article 2 (7) further provide that “This non‐interventionist principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII”. This seeks to suggest that domestic 
jurisdiction part does not interfere with the authority as articulated in Chapter VII. In addition to 
Chapter VII the UN since its inception has had substantial human rights structures. These 
includes but not limited to: UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948); the Convention on the 
Prevention of the Crime of Genocide (1948); the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966); and the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966). Flowing from 
this, it can be argued that humanitarian intervention falls outside the Article 2 (7) prohibition 
scope (Meggle, 2004). However, in reality when the military action is authorized by the Security 




Now let turn to Article 2 (4) of the Charter which prohibits the use of force including the threat 
to use force. It states “all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”. The proponents of humanitarian 
intervention doctrine suggest that it is legal in the current Charter and that the prohibition only 
focus on three cases (Ayoob, 2002). To start with, humanitarian intervention doctrine is legal in 





integrity. Violation of territorial integrity entails the control of another state‟s territory. The 
second issue relates to political independence. If the intervention is aimed at restoring or 
installing democracy it can be said it promotes political independence as oppose to violating it. 
Lastly, among other key purposes of the UN is to promote human rights, therefore, intervention 
based on protection of human rights cannot amount to violation of Article 2 (4) if interpreted in 




Contrary to the above interpretation of Article 2 (4) the detractors holds that the prohibition 
contained here is complete without any exception. With regard to the wording “…or in any other 
manner inconsistent…” is not meant to permit exceptions to the rule but to make it undisputable. 
 
In relation to international law as codified in the Article 53 and 54 of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties the detractors holds that prohibition in Article 2 (4) is part of 
jus cogens. This suggests that it is acknowledged as a norm which ought to be followed without 




As much as the standing of an unauthorized humanitarian intervention is uncertain, it position 
might also be influenced by worrisome set of laws known as customary international law. The 
latest states‟ practice in relation to humanitarian intervention has the potential to lay a foundation 
for evolution of the new rules of customary law (Finnemore, 2003). The American Law Institute 
in its Restatement of Foreign Relations Law defines customary international law as the “general 
and consistent practices of states that they follow from a sense of legal obligation”. With this 
definition come two important components: the presence of common and consistence state 





that. Among states, the development of customary international law remains a contentious issue. 
There has not been an agreed upon definitions of legal obligation and of state practice. The 
argument is that any actor who wants to bring about development of customary international law 




Contrary to this view, there is a view that the actual act is bound to violate the existing 
customary international law. There seem to be no consensus as to say with the exclusion of 
actual act what constitutes state practice. “First, the least controversial source is policy 
statements, legislation and diplomatic correspondence. Second treaties, particularly multilateral 
but also bilateral, are often utilised as evidence of international customary law. Third, the 
writings of jurists are a common source of customary law. Finally, United Nations General 
Assembly resolutions and other non‐binding statements and resolutions by multilateral 
organisations are often viewed as a source of international customary law” (Jackson, 1990:60). 
Adding to the problem of determining which acts are relevant is the uncertainty as relate to the 
degree of widespread of state practice. Theoretically the states practice should be general, 
meaning the majority if not all states should follow it. In reality this is not possible; as a result 
customary international law is based on selective cases of superpowers. “The conception that 
international customary law is being made by a limited group of states is of concern to many, but 
it is true that powerful states have always had a disproportionate influence on customary 
law‐making, mainly because they have a broader range of interests and consequently engage in 










In light of all these, one holds the view that a new customary norm of humanitarian intervention 
has been developed as an exception to the rule of the prohibition of the use of force. As noted in 
the above discussion, customary international law permits for the establishment of such a norm 
by means of development of consistent and widespread practice coupled by opinio juris. Despite 
this, there are no many unauthorized humanitarian interventions so; the likelihood is that the 
changes in the international law are likely to be by means of the UN Charter. And in the 





During the Cold War it was not likely to find moral and ethical considerations informing state‟s 
foreign policy especially when relates to security. However, the end of Cold War brought of 
about paradigm shift from such behaviour. The post-Cold War period has been characterized by 
acts of humanitarianism despite that there is no codified law prescribing moral and ethical 




Basically, an ethical decision is one that can reasonable take “a universal point of view and 
believes that the notion of morals applies some sentiment common to all mankind, which 
recommends the same object to general approbation. Regardless of the discussions in relation to 
the merits and demerits of relative thoughts, there is a general agreement relating to the kind of 
behaviour that might lead to intervention. In the post-Cold War period, humanitarian intervention 
serves as an example of emerging importance of morality in the international arena. While 
morality only featured now in the foreign policy of states‟ morality of war is quite old” (Meggle, 





rules on how and why war should be fought. “Natural Law developed from the common threads 
that characterises traditional Western Greco‐Roman and Christian thought and can be seen as a 
set of values, based on what are assumed to be the permanent characteristics of human nature 
that can serve as a standard for evaluating conduct” (Meggle, 2004:38). Stoics came with the 
most concrete traditional formulation of natural law. They hold that every man have reasoning 
ability whom which they use to appreciate and obey law. 
 
 
In addition to that they hold that world is governed by reason. Due to the fact that people have 
free will they will not follow the reasoning firmed. This principle was promoted within Romans 
by Cicero “there is in fact a true law ‐ namely, right reason ‐ which is in accordance with nature, 
applies to all men, and is unchangeable and eternal. By its commands this law summons men to 
performance of their duties; by its prohibitions it restrains them from doing wrong. Its commands 
and prohibitions always influence good men, but are without effect on the bad. To invalidate this 
law by human legislation is never morally right, nor is it permissible ever to restrict its operation, 
and to annul it wholly is impossible……The man who will not obey it will abandon his better 
self, and, in denying the true nature of man, will thereby suffer the severest penalties, though he 
has escaped all the other consequences which men call punishment” (Meggle, 2004:43). 
 
Upon being familiar with natural law principle, Christians realized that it is harmonious with 
their beliefs. St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-74) teachings on natural law are commonly known. He 
holds that there is natural law constituting part on eternal law (Bazyler, 1987). He saw such law 
as giving all people the inclination to behaviours which are appropriate to them. Accordingly, 





and moral guide. The Stoics, St. Thomas and the Romans shared the view that any positive law 






 century the societies were becoming more secular, hence there was a shift away 
from the then dominant theocentric view towards anthropocentric. Such shift was also influenced 
by the enlightenment period (Hensel, 2004). Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) is taken as a founder of 
the current natural law. He holds that natural law is the body of rules based on reasoning. His 
position is that even if there was no God but the natural law can still be valid. Natural law is 
different from positive law but continues to be the underlying base for morality (Hensel, 2004). 
Morality is derived neither from custom nor positive law but form base for humans. The United 
Nations Declaration of Human Rights can be seen as the development of natural law in a secular 
age. It reinforces the key concept of natural law proponents that the global community has a 
responsibility to protect the right of all peoples to realise their essential being, and therefore, 




This form of obligation to human rights is entrenched in the Just War theories. The morality 
which is entrenched in the Just War theories appears in the 5
th
 century Augustine, 13
th
 Thomas 
Aquinas   and   today‟s   teachings.   Despite   the   fact   that   this   principle   originated   mainly from 
 
Christians it lacks religious justifications. Morality of war provides a useful starting point for 
examining the morality of humanitarian intervention since it also uses force. The doctrine 
establishes a range of principles that must be satisfied for the war to be ethically justified. These 








the legitimacy of decision to go to war while Jus in Bello establishes the right conduct during 




Just War theories establish six criteria under Jus ad Bellum. The first one is that there must be a 
just cause. This means that there must be a good reason for going to war that is to protect the 
innocent civilians. For example to prevent genocide or to restore rights wrongfully denied or to 
re-establish order (Simms & Trim, 2011). The second one is that there must be a proportional 
cause. In addition to being just, the cause must be serious enough to warrant engaging in war. 
There must be a reasonable expectation that the outcome will bring about enough good to offset 
the inevitable pain and destruction of war. The third criterion is that the aim must be to create a 
better, more just, subsequent peace than there would have been if war had not taken place 




The fourth one is that the decision to go to war must be taken by proper authorities (Simms & 
Trim, 2011). Historically the right authority has usually meant the ruler or the government of a 
sovereign state. However, in modern times it is usually considered that a higher authority than a 
single state, such as the United Nations, is required. However, in practice regional bodies or 
coalitions of hegemonic states often take action without UN approval. The fifth one is that there 
must be a prospect of success. This means that there must be a reasonable chance that the action 
will succeed. The last criterion is that the decision to go to war must be taken as a last resort 










There are two criteria under Jus in Bello. The first one is discrimination; this specifies the 
conduct during war. It says that there must be no deliberate attack on the innocent civilians. 
Deliberate attack means attack in which harm to the innocent civilians is the purposeful, or 
important to accomplish the mission (Reisman, 1985). “This does not rule out an attack in which 
harm may befall the innocent as long as all that could have been done to reasonably protect the 
innocent is done, consistent with the legitimate military purpose of the action” (Reisman, 
1985:45). The second one is proportionality; “it says an action must not be taken in which the 
harm done is an unreasonably heavy price to pay for the likely military victory” (Reisman, 
1985:45). The damage or destruction must be compared against lives of both armed combatants 
in the war as well as the civilians. There is a strong linkage between Just War principles as 
discussed earlier and the moral guidelines contained in the International Commission on 





The first requirement as conveyed in the Jus ad Jellum is the magnitude of the crisis. This is 
inclusive of the just cause and proportionate cause of the war. Under normal circumstances there 
are two situations in which humanitarian intervention can be justified (Lowe, 2007). Firstly, it is 
in the case where government commits mass atrocities. Secondly, in the case where government 
fail to maintain law and order. The controversial issue is the magnitude of violations of human 
rights which warrants justifiable humanitarian intervention. “Additionally, there is near universal 
agreement that the threshold for military intervention must be very high. Generally, it is agreed 








lesser occurrences that entail the actual or imminent large scale loss of life would also justify 




The second requirement as articulated in the ICISS is the aim of the intervention. There must be 
right intension. This speaks to the key motives for humanitarian intervention (Lowe, 2007). One 
might argue that the main purpose should be to protect ill-treated people. “The intervention 
should be apolitical or disinterested which would prevent the seizure of territory or the 
installation of a puppet regime under the guise of protecting innocent civilians. Others take a less 
severe view of motivations. …the true test is whether the intervention has put an end to human 
rights deprivations” (Simms & Trim, 2011:19). This is enough to meet the requirements of 
disinterestedness; inclusive of the cases where there are no humanitarian reasons informing the 
intervention. Wheeler suggests a sliding scale of international legitimacy which approves of 
interventions carried out on humanitarian grounds and he further show tolerance to those which 




The third requirement is that the intervention should be multilateral. This entails that the decision 
to intervene must be taken by proper authorities. Interventions should be multilateral and be 
authorised by the UN Security Council in order to limit abuse. This should exclude the 
interventions by super powers. On the ethical point of view intervention by single hegemonic 
state is morally impermissible (Jackson, 1990). “If a multinational intervention is ethically sound 
it is hard to argue that it would not remain so if conducted by a single state. Similarly, hesitation 








the confidence in an otherwise justifiable intervention. In fact, hegemonic powers are among the 




The last requirement to be fulfilled is that the intervention ought to be carried out as a last resort. 
It is only after all other measures have been employed and failed that the application of force 
should be allowed. Jackson (1990) and Simms & Trim (2011) share a view that force should 
follow after visually all possible measures have fell short. Such measures are inclusive of fact 
finding missions, mediation in conflict, political, economic and other kinds of sanctions. The 
latter author notes that these measures are no casting stones with fixed series of events but are 





Contrary to four requirements of Jus ad Jellum, Jus in Bello has two requirements to be fulfilled 
for the intervention to be justified. The first one is proportionality. The degree of force applied 
must be equivalent to the provocation in question; it must not be an excessive force. It must be 
not an unnecessary disastrous force but falls within the scope of ethical decision making. The 
second one which is the last speaks to the impact of the intervention. This includes the 
discrimination of non-combatants during war and the chances for successful intervention. 
However, it is not easy to judge whether or not the intervention will produce more good than 




An intervening state or group of states ought to act within the parameters of International Human 





to other parties concerned. These are inclusive of the civilians being protected, the combatants in 
conflict and the intervening actor itself. “Determining the costs and benefits of interventions are 
difficult to assess prior to the actual use of coercion. This reality makes proportionality and 
impact the most subjective of criteria, particularly when the uncertainties of waging war and the 
subjective judgements of what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable damage are taken into 
account” (Simms & Trim, 2011:26). Further to that, the principle in question suggests that there 
must be realistic chances of successful intervention. By implication this suggests that it would 
not be easy to wage successful humanitarian goals against super powers (Simms & Trim, 2011). 
 
Overall, it is one‟s contention that Just War practices can serve as a determinant in the dilemma 















































The doctrine of unilateral humanitarian intervention has been a subject of discussion in the 
international arena for quite some time, as it can be traced back to the writings of Augustine, St. 
Thomas Aquinas and Hugo Grotius. Regardless of its long existence, it remains one of the 
controversial areas due to its inconsistence with state sovereignty doctrine (Reisman, 1990). 
Since the formation of the current statehood, state sovereignty doctrine has been central in 
regulating interactions among states. This doctrine is embedded in the U.N. Charter and 
customary law as the major sources of international law. As it is among the core principles of the 
international law it plays an important role in maintaining world order. According to Wright 
(1989) the non-intervention principle enshrined in state sovereignty doctrine make it to be the 
supreme principle. The principle of non-intervention rejects the interference of external actors in 
the domestic affairs of a sovereign state. It assumes that states are at liberty to make their own 
decisions; basically it means the independence of the state (Wright, 1989). 
 
The term unilateral humanitarian intervention usually is used to characterize an “armed 
interference by one or several states in the internal affairs of another state, without its prior 
consent, in order to curtail gross human rights violations in the state” (Burmester, 1994:39). Due 
to the lack of prior consent then it violates the sovereignty of the state which intervention is 
taking place. Since it violates the supreme principle of state sovereignty it then needs a strong 
justification (Burmester, 1994). It is easy to find moral justification but hard to get legal 





unilateral humanitarian intervention remains contentious. Scholars of international relations like 
Schabas maintain that the U.N. Charter outlaws unilateral use of force inclusive of those who are 
carried out on humanitarian grounds. 
 
 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION 
 
The doctrine of state sovereignty is central in regulation of states‟ interaction and maintaining of 
peace and order. It plays a huge role in protecting weaker states against possible abuse by 
superpowers (Geissler, 2000). State sovereignty denotes the independence and legal status of a 
state. The doctrine of state sovereignty has long been part on the international system, but the 
current understanding of the concept has roots in the Treaty of Westphalia. “The supremacy of 
the sovereign authority was established within a system of independent and equal states as a 
measure to avoid another war after nearly three decades of war, and thus establish peace and 
order in Europe (Geissler, 2000: 325)”. It is important to know the central characteristics of 
statehood mainly because for a unit to be sovereign it must be a state first. The major 
characteristics of a state as agreed upon in Montevideo Convention include citizens, defined 




The U.N. Charter acknowledges the importance of state sovereignty; in line with that it embraces 
the principle of sovereign equality of all state in the international arena. “Flowing from the 
importance of the principle of the sovereign equality of all states, the Charter sought to prohibit 
interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states by other sovereign states, especially the 
threat or use of force” (Simma, 1990:48). The U.N. Charter in ensuring the promotion of 





United Nations to intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present 




The inviolability of the non-interference doctrine is accepted even by the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) which is the primary judicial branch of the U.N. The ICJ stated in 1949 that 
 
“between independent states, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of 
international relations” (Harris, 1998:67). And about thirty years down the line it further noted 
that “the principle of non-intervention was the fundamental principle of state sovereignty on 
which the whole of international law rests” (Bazyler, 1987:41). Due to this, it can be concluded 
that neither states nor international organizations holds the right to interfere in the internal affairs 
of a sovereign state. 
 
 
DEFINITION OF UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
 
Just like other phenomenon in the international arena, humanitarian intervention has been given 
many definitions. It has been referred to as the “justifiable use of force for the purpose of 
protecting the inhabitants of another state from treatment so arbitrary and persistently abusive as 
to exceed the limits within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reasons and justice” 
(Arend, 1993:25). Abiew had defined it as “the theory of intervention on the ground of humanity 
that recognizes the right of one state to exercise an international control by military force over 
the acts of another in regard to its internal sovereignty when contrary to the law of humanity” 
(1999:43). A present day scholar Teson in O‟Connell said it “the proportionate trans-boundary 





being denied basic human rights and who themselves would be rationally willing to revolt 




All these definitions are different, but they all reflect what the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention entails. All these definitions cover common characteristics of the concept of 
humanitarian intervention as the use of force. Teson correctly captured that the traditional 
meaning of unlawful interventions means “dictatorial interference in the affairs of another state 
for purposes of altering or maintaining the actual order of things in a matter which is essentially 
within the discretion of the target state” (O‟Connell, 2000: 36). Deducting from these definitions, 
in order for intervention to qualify as unlawful the force must have been applied in the domestic 




PURPOSES OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
CURTAILING MASSIVE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
 
The most popular justification in support of humanitarian interventions is the stoppage of mass 
slaughter committed by states on their nationals. Since the end of the Cold War an estimate of 
169, 198, 000 people have been murdered by their own governments (Misha, 1999). This number 
far exceeds the sum of the World Wars killings. These interventions have been carried out in 
response to grave human rights abuses (Misha, 1999). 
 
 
MAINTAINING REGIONAL AND GLOBAL STABILITY 
 
The second reason used to legitimise humanitarian intervention is maintenance of regional and 





threatened. This results from the refugees fleeing their land looking for safer places. This was 
partly the case with India‟s intervention in East Bengal known today as Bangladesh. The 
government started killing its citizens and people flooded India. It was reported that more than 
10 million people entered India avoiding persecution in East Bengal (Misha, 1999). 
 
 
TREATY LAW – UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 
 
The foundation of international law concerning the application of force is found in the U.N. 
Charter (Mingst, 1995). Every issue pertaining the lawfulness or lack thereof of the application 
of force in the international law evolved around article 2 (4) of the U.N. Charter. It states that 
 
“all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the objectives of Purposes of the United Nations.” The Charter then allows for two 
exceptions to the rule: article 51 in cases of self-defence and Chapter VII the exception to non-
intervention doctrine. To cement the prohibition of the application of force as stated in article 
2(4), article 2(7) further outlaws the intervention by the UN itself on the domestic affairs of any 




The fundamental problem is that in the presence of both article 2(4) and 2(7) respectively, there 
exists the right of humanitarian intervention taking into account the phrasing of the above 
articles. The intervention in accordance with Chapter VII is legitimate and is excluded here. The 
dilemma is an unauthorized intervention, collective or individually (Mingst, 1995). Within the 
Charter there is an emphasis on independence, sovereignty and equality of states. In the same 





general understanding of the Charter, there is a view that humanitarian intervention is illegal 




SUGGESTED REVISIONS OF THE UN CHARTER 
 
The problem for the international community surely does not rise from states‟ willingness to 
intervene. Rather it rises from states willingness not to intervene and look for excuses for that 
(Cronin, 2002). Hopefully, the intervention in Kosovo is likely to make it hard for the 
international community not to intervene in cases of atrocities. As much as this is imperative, the 
decision to intervene should be inclusive of the Security Council. This is important to the UN as 
Human Rights protection is one of the core principles of the Charter. Currently, the Charter does 





According to Bellamy “the distribution of powers between the different organs of the UN is part 
of a complex political and legal construction with the collective security system at its centre. 
Under the collective security system, the role of the UNSC is, or has been until now, to ensure 
international peace and international order. The issue of human rights protection has been of only 
secondary importance to the UNSC within this framework” (Bellamy, 2004:64). The perfect 
solution to ensure Human Rights protection within the collective security system would be to 
amend the Charter. The Charter should be organized in such a way that it allows the Security 
Council to legally invoke Human Rights and International Law as the motivation for 
intervention. This amendment should not allow international community to standby while 





way to amend would be to make reference on the current articles without adding new ones. 
Article 1 for instance, relates to the purposes of the UN and the Human Rights issue can be 
added there. It reads “to maintain international peace and security”; it can then read “To 
maintain international peace and security and respect for human rights” (Bellamy, 2004). 
 
 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
In the international arena customs are understood to be the rules emerged out of states‟ practice 
and other states abide by them because they think there is a law compelling them to do so 
 
(Fonteyne, 1998). Rebecca Wallace in Fontyne notes that it “a practice followed by those 
concerned because they feel legally obliged to behave in such a way” (1998:28). For an action to 
qualify as state practice it is required that such an action is generally followed by other states 
under impression that they are oblige to do so by law. It remains central to divorce custom from 
other actions followed for different reasons like friendship. What distinguishes custom from 
other norms is the fact that custom is result from state practice and opinion juris. On one hand, 
state practice originates from states‟ behaviour (Fonteyne, 1998). On the other hand, opinion 
juris is an individual belief by states that behaviour is required by law. In order the customary 
international law to be formed, states‟ action or behaviour must constitute both states‟ practice 
and opion juris. Failure to meet the above criteria means the absence of legitimate customary 
international law (Fonteyne, 1998). 
 
 
STATE PRACTICE AFTER 1945 
 









The Cold War period was full of antagonism and hostility between the Western and Soviet and 
their respective allies. There was a minimal cooperation if any; rivalries would support opposing 
sides of the conflict for the purpose of defying each other (Ghali, 1996). This rivalry between the 
two powers rendered the Security Council ineffective. In every case there is need for 
humanitarian assistance the Security Council could not act because one member would veto the 
decision (Ghali, 1996). Almost all interventions during the Cold War period were driven by 
ideologies, due to that they will not be discussed here. However; two interventions had neither 
Western nor Soviet influence as a consequence they were regarded as humanitarian although 
other motives were suspected for intervening. 
 
INDIA IN EAST BENGAL (BANGLADESH), 1971 
 
On independence in 1947 India separated into India and Pakistan. Pakistan was a divided 
society; it was divided into East and West Pakistan and was further divided on ethnic lines 
(Henkin, 1995). They were only united by the shared religion and their hostility to India. By 
1970 West Pakistan which was the smallest in terms of size had already got political and 
economic control of East Pakistan. This led to political riots in the East. When the general 
elections were held in 1990 the Awami League which was the opposition got the majority of 
seats in the National assembly. They then demanded more autonomy (Henkin, 1995). The central 
government under the leadership of President Yahya Khan was not happy with the results and 
delayed the National Assembly indefinitely. This provoked the Awami League and 1971 it 




In response to the declaration of emancipation, West Pakistan launch strikes destroying property 





were murdered the majority being the Hindu minority (Henkin, 1995). About ten million 
refugees entered India putting serious strain on India. Due to that and border killings the 
relationship between India and Pakistan became bitter. This led to Indian forces attacking 
Pakistan and thereafter recognizing Bangladesh as an independent state. After a twelve day war, 
West Pakistan was defeated. At the beginning India evoked humanitarian reasons to justify its 
attack. Addressing the UN the Indian representative said “we have … absolutely nothing but the 
purest of motives and the purest intentions: to rescue the people of East Bengal from what they 
are suffering” (Cassese, 1999:61). At the later stage India changed its justification to self-
defence. It submitted that during the border battles it was also attacked (Cassese, 1999). 
 
 
The  responses  from  the  international  community  were  not  mutual.  There  was  an  argument  that 
 
India‟s intervention could not be deemed as a legitimate humanitarian intervention thus does not 
support the legality of humanitarian intervention (Cassese, 1999). There was a general consensus 
that India had more selfish reasons for intervening than it had humanitarian. Given that Pakistan 
was a powerful enemy its split was strategic for India‟s security. Nevertheless, the above 
explanation does not weaken humanitarianism and the existence of such a rule (Henkin, 1995). It 
is so because for intervention to be a legitimate humanitarian intervention does not require the 
action to be motivated only by human rights concerns because it hard to figure out all the reasons 




India was heavily criticised by the UN with the majority of its member state openly lambasting 
the action characterizing it as the unlawful violation of state sovereignty (Henkin, 1995). The 





absence of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. According to Bazyler India‟s intervention 
was a classical case for humanitarianism and suggested that it supported the doctrine. He noted 
that the action can be legally impermissible at the time of it execution but lay a foundation for 




TANZANIA IN UGANDA, 1979 
 
In Uganda under Idi Amin‟s regime the government slaughtered own citizens and severe human 
rights abuses took place between 1971 and 1979 (Reisman, 1985). About three hundred thousand 
people were killed in this campaign. The campaign included rape, torture and public executions. 
In the cause of killings border skirmishes resulted in bitter relations between Uganda and 
neighbouring Tanzania (Reisman, 1985). In 1978 Uganda attacked and occupied Kagera, a 
Tanzanian territory. Amin later announced that Uganda has taken over that territory. This action 
further fuelled the tension between the two countries and President Nyerere saw the seizure of 
Tanzanian land as declaration of war. Towards the end of 1979, Tanzania entered Ugandan soil 
and attacked Amin‟s troops. This action was welcomed by Ugandan citizens. Nyerere‟s troops 




After the war, it was argued that Tanzania acted out of own interest. It was so because on the 
first invasion Tanzania had evoked self-defence. Just after the attack Nyerere said “[the] war 
between Tanzania and Idi Amin‟s regime in Uganda was caused by the Ugandan army‟s 
aggression against Tanzania and Idi Amin‟s claim to have annexed part of Ugandan territory. 
There was no other cause for it” (Nanda, 1992:12). However, it was known that humanitarianism 





some stage, Nyerere had referred to Amin regime as “thugs” which Ugandan people possess a 
full right to overthrow (Nanda, 1992). The overthrowing of Amin was described by Tanzanian 
foreign ministry as “a tremendous victory for the people of Uganda and a singular triumph for 




In examining the legitimacy of the Ugandan invasion by Nyerere‟s troops with regards to the 
legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention, it is worth taking into account that the 
international community responded positively to it. Tanzania was not really chastised for its 
action although it was a violation of international law. Johann Mouton suggested that lenience 
towards Tanzania‟s action implied acceptance of the humanitarian doctrine. “This is surely 
tantamount to saying that the international community as a whole recognized in this case the 
primacy of a modicum of human dignity over sovereignty” (Nanda, 1992:14). Contrary to this, 
 
Tanzania never used humanitarianism as the justification for war. As a consequence, this case 




INTERVENTIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR, 1990-PRESENT 
 
The beginning of 1990s saw brought about changes in the international arena. The changes were 
as the result of the end of Cold War and with them, came a new world order. This brought hope 
that the United Nations in particular the Security Council could function. “The conclusion of the 
Cold War … presented a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for the nations of the world, acting 
individually, collectively and through the UN …to help achieve two principal purposes of the 
 
UN: the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion and encouragement 





Security Council, many post- 1990 interventions were authorized by the Security Council and 




USA, UK AND FRANCE IN IRAQ, 1991 
 
The Kurds people are scattered all over: turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. In Iraq they have been 
claiming sovereignty as back as the late 19
th
 century. Iraq under Saddam Hussein‟s regime 
systematically murdered over ten thousands Kurds in 1985 (Ghali, 1996). In 1991, just after the 
Persian Gulf War the Kurds attempted military action against the government. Nevertheless they 
could not sustain it. Government forces reacted by wiping their villages killing about over one 
million civilians (Ghali, 1996). An estimated three million Kurds ran escaped to Iran and Turkey. 
 
Flowing from that, the Security Council passed Resolution 668 “Condemns the repression of the 
Iraqi civil population… Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to removing the threat to 
international peace and security in the region, immediately end this repression … Appeals to all 
 
Member States and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to these humanitarian relief 
efforts” (Ghali, 1996:35). The resolution did mention threat to global peace but never authorized 
any use of force in line with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It neither makes reference to 
collective enforcement measures nor explicitly authorizes the use of force. Regardless of the UN 
resolution the “USA UK and France announced their plans of „Operation Provide Comfort‟ to 
establish „safe havens‟ and a „no-fly-zone‟ in Northern Iraq” (Ghali, 1996:37). However, Perez 
de Cuellar the then UN Secretary General conveyed his discomfort as the intervention without 










Despite that, the planned military action proceeded. President Bush cited humanitarian reasons 
for the action. The UN Secretary General accepted the importance of acting on moral and 
humanitarian grounds (Stromseth, 1993). The British Foreign Ministry said “we operate under 
international law. Not every action that a British Government or an American Government or a 
French Government takes has to be underwritten by a specific provision in a UN resolution 
provided we comply with international law. International law recognizes extreme humanitarian 
needs” (Stromseth, 1993:42). Just after the military action the alliance attempted to get the UN to 
take responsibility. For the operation to be legal consent from Iraq was required. They 





One disagrees with the conclusion that the operation was legal through consent. Events unfolded 
openly, a substantial number of allied forces invaded Iraq without its consent or UN authority 
and at a later stage pressured Iraq to agree on the presence of minimal UN forces. This 
intervention clearly falls under the scope of unilateral humanitarian intervention. In a 
memorandum to the British Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Office, the legal counsel said 
that: “the intervention in northern Iraq „Provide Comfort‟ was in fact, not specifically mandated 
by the United Nations, but the states taking action in northern Iraq did so exercise of the 
customary international law principle of humanitarian intervention” (Lobel & Ratner, 1999:52). 
 
As alluded before these were not official justifications but communiqué among them. This 










ECOWAS IN LIBERIA, 1990 
 
On  the  eve  of  Christmas  in  1989,  Charles  Taylor  and  his  National  Patriotic  Front  of  Liberia 
 
(NPFL) attacked with the intention to topple Samuel Doe‟s authoritarian regime in Liberia 
(Eisner, 1993). Doe‟s regime was characterized by massive human rights violations. By August 
 
1990, Taylor‟s army had conquered the whole part of Liberia but Monrovia, the capital. War 
continued with splinter armies from both sides making the situation to be more complex. Both 
 
Doe‟s and Taylor‟s forces were engaged in torturing and murdering. The estimated number of 




As the civil war drags on the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) resolved 
to military action against Liberia. It justification was on the basis that “there is a state of anarchy 
and total breakdown of Law and order in Liberia. … These developments have traumatized the 
 
Liberian population and greatly shocked the people of the sub-region and the rest of the 
international community” (Wippman, 1993:23). ECOWAS intervention resulted in establishment 




The Security Council thereafter passed resolution 788 where it said “determining that the 
deterioration of the situation in Liberia constitutes a threat to international peace and security…. 
Recalling the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations…. Recognising the 
need for increased humanitarian assistance…. Commends ECOWAS for its efforts to restore 
peace, security and stability in Liberia…. Requests the Secretary General to dispatch urgently a 
Special Representative to Liberia to evaluate the situation….” (Wippman, 1993:26). Just like the 





to Iraq the resolution is passed when the intervention has already started. This was another sign 
that the Security Council members were sceptical to approve the military action in the war zone 
as the result of the Persian Gulf War had led to troubles in Somalia. This action was taken as a 
multilateral intervention on the grounds of humanitarian reasons (Wippman, 1993). However, the 





Despite the fact that the Security Council never gave ECOWAS the right to intervene, it 
commended ECOWAS for its effort (Wippman, 1993). This signals support for the intervention 
in question. There is an argument that Security Council members accepted the intervention as 
legitimate but sceptical of making a fragile precedent. This argument does not hold water for 
simply reasons. ECOWAS should have deployed armed forces from the beginning but decided 
not to. By commending the action meant that they recognized that military action was needed 
from the onset (Wippman, 1993). This intervention does not offer much with respect to the 
legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention under customary law as the UN claim it to be 
under it authority. 
 
 
NATO IN KOSOVO, 1999 
 
The end of war in Bosnia came with expectations of peace in the region. However, that was just 
a dream with the ill-treatment of Kosovo-Albanians by President Slobodan Milosevic of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Malanczuk, 2000). He put into place segregation policies 
similar to that of apartheid South Africa. By 1996 the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) had 





their attacks on KLA up to 1998 when the international community finally put its attention to 
Kosovo (Malanczuk, 2000). On March 31, 1998, the Security Council passed resolution 1160, in 
which it condemned “the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and 
peaceful demonstrations in Kosovo, as well as acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army” 
 
(Wheeler, 2001:37). Further to condemnation the resolution also imposed weapons embargo and 




The aggressions did not stop and victims of war started entering Albania and Macedonia to 
escape aggression. The Security Council passed another resolution that “affirming that the 
deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to 
peace and security in the region…. Demands …that the authorities of the Federal Republic of 
 
Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian leadership take immediate steps to improve the 







As much as the situation necessitated the application of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it was 
however, not applied not even a threat to apply it. It was clear that the military action was not 
going to be resolved to as Russia and China were going to veto such a decision (Henkin, 1999) . 
The aggression became more intense forcing the NATO to intervene. In October 1998 NATO 
threatened to use air strikes should the Serbs continue with killings in Kosovars villages. On the 
last minute NATO deployed US Special Envoy to talk to President Milosevic which resulted on 
the cease-fire agreement and the presence of inspector of Organization on Security and 







The delicate agreement was crushed by the KLA as they were not part of the negotiations. In 
response to that FRY army killed 45 civilians which surprised the world. NATO called both 
parties into the table in Paris in the attempt to find last minutes solution (Kritsiotis, 2000). They 
could not agree neither FRY nor KLA accepted the terms of discussions. On the 23
rd
 of March 
1999 NATO forces started attacking FRY through air strikes. Number of justifications was 
submitted. The first one was that the preservation of NATO‟s credibility as a defence 
organization. This is not a legal justification. The second one was that the military action was in 
line with Security Council resolutions (Kritsiotis, 2000). The presence of China and Russia in the 
council weakens this argument because the Security Council would have not supported military 





The justification relevant here is the one which evoke humanitarian reasons. It was claimed that 
the aim was to prevent an impending catastrophe. “We were left with no other way of preventing 
the present humanitarian crisis from becoming a catastrophe than by taking military action to 
limit the capacity of Milosevic‟s army to repress the Kosovar Albanians (Kritsiotis, 
2000:34)”.The significance of this military action is embedded in the international community‟s 
response to it. The intervention was supported by the large number of western countries. Britain 
for example said that the intervention was legally legitimate under the customary international 
law. China referred to it as „absolute gunboat diplomacy‟ while Russian representatives in the 
UN stated that “what is in the balance now is the question of law and lawlessness. It is a question 





values of the United Nations Charter, or tolerating a situation I which gross force dictates 
realpolitik” (Henkin, 1999:42). Russia mobilized support from India and Belarus, together they 
proposed a resolution to condemn the intervention but they lost in a voting process. The Security 
Council never condemned this intervention despite the fact that it was carried out on 




In addition to that the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan showed lenience towards NATO‟s 
unauthorized action. He said “this year‟s conflict in Kosovo raised equally important questions 
about the consequences of action without international consensus and clear legal authority… On 
the one hand is it legitimate for a regional organization to use force without a UN mandate? On 
the other, is it permissible to let gross and systematic violations of human rights, with grave 
humanitarian consequences, continue unchecked?” (Dana, 2000:37). Lastly, there was no serious 




A thorough evaluation of incidences of unilateral humanitarian intervention as discussed here in 
this project shows that the international community is slowly moving towards accepting the 
doctrine of unilateral humanitarian intervention. The intervention in Iraq by Britain, France and 
US forces got a minimal support from the international community. The successive incidences 
got more support specifically from the UN. The UN commended ECOWAS invasion in Liberia. 
With NATO, it did not get a clear support as ECOWAS but the rejection of a proposal to 










Taking into account these interventions especially ECOWAS in Liberia and NATO in Kosovo 
and respective responses they got, one can conclude that there is a shift toward acceptance of the 
doctrine in question under customary law. The rule has not yet fully evolved but the precedent 
has been laid. 
 




Both the supporters and critics of the NATO intervention in Kosovo share the same sentiment 
that it presented a paradigm shift from an old state practice in the field of intervention. The 
importance of this intervention owes to the fact that it was executed outside the United Nations‟ 
authority and there was no attempt to evoke law in its justification (Meggle, 2004). For the 
previous interventions the United States (US) had requested permission from the Security 
Council. This was the case with the First Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia but with Kosovo 
it did not even approach the Security Council, as a consequence the intervention fell outside the 
scope of the U.N. Charter (Meggle, 2004). 
 
This change of behaviour by the NATO can be better explained through constructivism. The 
understanding is that states will always look for the justifications to legitimize its action using a 
well-established norm. The notion of constraint is derived from constructivist understandings of 
how actors are embedded with a normative context structured by rules. One should reiterate that 
norms are not physical barriers but are constraining devices within the international community 
of legitimate practice. As Wheeler noted that the change of norms provides actors with new 
legitimate reasons to justify their actions. However, the change in norms does not mean that an 
action will always take place. On interventions prior to Kosovo, there was an emphasis that 
interference from other states was considered a significant violation of sovereignty. However,  
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now this is no longer the case. States which violate human rights on its land now are seen as 




For those who support the intervention in question like the former U.N. General Kofi Annan, it 
represented some kind of hegemony under the US command. For the critics like China and 
Russia it was the US‟ rejection of the U.N. and international law Secretary (Meggle, 2004). 
According to Wolfe (2002) for those who were more vigilant it points to the likely- wood of the 
emergence of the world order where human rights supersede the sovereignty of the state and 
interests of Security Council members. The advocates of these above positions seem to agree that 
Kosovo brought about important separation between law, military force and international 
institutions. For Wolfe it did not only represent a break from old practice but it set a new 
precedent which was followed in Afghanistan and Iraq (Wolfe, 2002). 
 
 
Beyond the fact that NATO had no permission from the Security Council, two things stood out 
in relation to the nexus between international law, military intervention and the U.N. as an 
institution. The first one is that the US never appealed to international law, instead it cited 
humanitarian‟s reasons. The second one is that the U.N. was totally side-lined throughout the 




Charney is his article Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo he holds that “despite 
the prohibition of the use of force as enshrined in the U.N. Charter, the use of force under the 
guise of humanitarian intervention provides a convincing justification for the NATO‟s military 
action in Kosovo” ( 2007:34). Regrettably, humanitarian intervention does not form part of the  
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exception to the rule. The U.N. Charter by no means grants such a right. The situation like the 
one of Kosovo cannot be justified under the current international law, neither by the U.N. 
Charter nor International Customary Law (Charney, 2007). The doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention can be applied when a state is protecting it‟s diasporas from mass murder; however, 
this according to the U.N. Charter will be catered for under self-defence. Illustrations can be 
drawn from actions in Domenic Republic, Congo and Panama. These interventions themselves 
fell under the self-defence justification but ulterior motives were suspected to be the driving 
force (Charney, 2007). 
The abuse of the exceptions as enshrined in the U.N. Charter necessitates that the prohibition 
part should be adhered to despite the legality of the intervention to protect own citizens (Murphy, 
1996). Not only Kosovo, other interventions which appealed to the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention fell short. Example can be drawn from intervention in East Pakistan by Indian forces 
to aid the Bengalis in the course of Pakistan‟s civil conflict. The General Assembly criticised this 
intervention and it was clear that India had other political scores to settle which were not 
humanitarian in nature. This was the indication that the international community is reluctant to 
accept such a doctrine (Murphy, 1996). The lack of clear evidence showing that states intervene 
solemnly on humanitarian grounds make it difficult for the state practice to be accepted as opinio 
juris in favour of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. However, NATO‟s intervention in 
 





Long due after the intervention, its legality and its effect on bringing about change for 
developing international law is still in question. Joy (2000) holds that scholars and commentators 
of the international relations are confronted with the legal and moral dilemma between the 
prohibition on the use of force and the fight against human rights abuses. It is without doubt that 
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NATO‟s intervention through its bombing campaign was inconsistent with the U.N. Charter and  
international customary law (Joy, 2000).The U.N. Charter clearly stipulates that “all members 
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations”. This means that NATO‟s actions threatened to weaken the law 
which prohibits the use of force by states without the UN nations‟ authority. Despite the good 
intentions by the NATO, it actions has a potential to establish a bad precedent for states to opt 
 
for use of force in stopping grave violations of human rights in other countries (Joy, 2000). 
Currently, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has the potential to result to conflict, 
disorder and international violence which is likely to erode the protection of human rights (Joy, 
2000). 
 
It is visible that the international law and organizations are not capable of dealing with cases like 
the one of Kosovo, then the international law and international bodies need to be developed to 
avoid possible future horrors and bring about protection of human rights. 
 
According to Tsagourias (2000) it is possible that the intervention in Kosovo laid the foundation 
for the development of a new law in relation to human rights protection. In principle, 
international law can be altered through the violation of existing law, the emergence on new state 
practice and opino juris supporting such change. Even in this context the intervention in Kosovo 
is still hard to fit in. In Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that in order 
to admit an international law rule, the state practice in question must clearly be based on that 
different rule of law. However, NATO‟s intervention was never justified on the grounds of a 
specific rule of law (Tsagourias, 2000). 
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During the course of the NATO‟s operation no legal justification was offered. It was only before 
the ICJ that the respondent evoked legal justification. Still it was only Belgium which raised 
humanitarian intervention as the possible legal justification. An additional barrier for altering the 
current international law is that the rule which prohibit the use of force is enshrined in the U.N. 
Charter. The U.N. Charter is not subject to be altered by new general international law. The U.N. 




The potential argument will be that the U.N. Charter itself should be amended on the grounds of 
a norm of equal status. Others scholars like Gray (2000) holds that humanitarian intervention 
doctrine is just a new and developed interpretation of the human rights provisions already in the 
U.N. Charter. This point can be backed by reference to the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
 
Treaties. It grants an agreement of treaty parties‟ persuasive value in relation to its interpretation, 
however, agreement of that nature is not likely to be seen in the UN (Gray, 2000). 
 
It is difficult to establish whether or not the international community is willing to give authority 
to individuals or group of states to use force against aggressive state on their own. Even within 
the NATO itself they are differences, this might be due to the fact that neither opinion juris nor 
state practice supports this proposition (Krisch, 2002). The General Assembly on many 
occasions has resolved to condemn specific interventions including some declarations dealing 
with issues like intervention and the use of force, and this shows international opposition to the 
kind of rule. In addition to that, none of the international tribunals authorizes such intervention. 
For these reasons, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention seems to be accepted as neither 





Regardless of these shortcomings and risks, the call for humanitarian intervention is looming. 
However, it remains unclear whether states would agree to such a doctrine. As for the weak 
states, they are likely to be skeptical due to the possible abuse it entails while stronger states are 
likely to maintain their veto power in Security Council. Although it is an imperfect solution, 
maintaining the status- quo and allow states to break the law in extreme cases like in Kosovo 
might be the best solution currently. Should the international community opt for creation of the 
new law, such law should be limited to the cases of serious breach of human rights. Before 
NATOs intervention in Kosovo there was no support for such proposal but now one might 
suggest that the Kosovo intervention have changed the situation. 
 
Now let turn to see how the international law can be developed to achieve the desired goals 
without risking the abuse and unnecessary damage. Currently it is the U.N. charter which gives 
authority to the Security Council to decide on interventions. In order for the vote to be passed 
three-fifth majority of Security Council members is required; in addition to that no veto by five 
permanent members should be raised (Wolf, 1988). This procedure has not proved to be effective 
except in early years of the UN inception and in the early 1990s. This calls for an alternative 
procedure that will legitimately provide for proper grounds for humanitarian intervention. The 
law to be established should be unambiguous and narrow (Simms & Trim, 2011). The agreement 
on that law can be reach either by overriding international law through cogens norm or through 
reinterpretation of the U.N. Charter (Simms & Trim, 2011). One takes into account the 
differences among the UN members which are likely to make this goal an imaginary goal. One 
should not underestimate the difficulty of accomplishing this objective. Nevertheless, several 




Possibly the following proposed procedural and factual requirements can form the base for 
suitable administration. Firstly, there must be clear evidence available to the international 
community verifying the widespread and grave international crimes as defined in the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (Ratner & Wippman, 2002). It should be evidently 
that a state in question aid, support or cannot control such criminal activities. Secondly, the 
regional organization in which the country in question is located must call upon the country in 
question to act against the abuse on its own or with the aid from other countries (Buergenthal & 
Murphy, 2002). Thirdly, the regional organization must attempt and exhaust all other non- 
forcible measures as political initiatives and economic sanctions. Fourthly, should the regional 
effort fail to yield desired results it should take the matter to the UN General Assembly for the 
immediate attention of the Security Council (Buergenthal & Murphy, 2002). The regional 
organization should appeal for Chapter VII authorization to take reasonable actions to stop the 
widespread and grave international crime. If the council grants the authority, the matter ought to 
be maintained under its control. Fifthly, the regional organization can now employ force to stop 
the widespread and grave violations of the international criminal law provided it takes the 
following precautionary measures: the targeted state must be informed in advance of the 
intension to employ force and upon intervention the collateral damage must be minimized. Such 
interventions are suitable to be executed by regional organizations as they require multiple states 
support as oppose to unilateral intervention (Buergenthal & Murphy, 2002). 
 
THE FUTURE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
 
Lessons learnt from the case of Kosovo necessitate the bridge of gap between the legality and 
legitimacy of intervention (Chesterman, 2001). The commission set up to investigate Kosovo  
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atrocities suggested that now there is a need to set up a legal framework to be used in the future.  
 
The commission suggested that the General Assembly pass this in a way that it resembles the 
Declaration on Human Rights. This framework would then be fused into the Charter to avoid 
overlapping. The commission further suggested the need to reinforce the importance of Human 
Rights protection and promotion (Chesterman, 2001). 
 
The proposal of the framework by the commission will ideally constitute of three requirements to 
be fulfilled in order for the intervention to be legitimate. The first requirement would be the 
extreme abuse of Human Rights which brings about civilians suffering or total collapse of  
government. The second requirement would be overarching commitment to protect civilians. The 
last requirement would be the prospect for success of that intervention (Chesterman, 2001). 
Above that, the framework would be inclusive of eight relative principles. These can be utilized 




In line with the history of the bipolarized world of the Cold War, now there is a serious 
discomfort regarding Western interventionism. The US-NATO domination in the post-Cold War 
has led to the state of vulnerability. This was demonstrated by NATO‟s decision to claim the 
right to intervene in Kosovo without the UN consent. In the same vein, this intervention 
displayed double standards on the side of international community in general and NATO in 
particular as they intervened in Kosovo but not in Rwanda. 
 
There has been a pragmatic shift on how the international community view the issues of Human 
Rights and state sovereignty. Before the inception of the Charter, the humanitarian intervention 
was allowed in some cases but there were no many interventions as and states were careful not to  
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invoke humanitarianism alone as their justification. This normative shift on the decision to 
intervene of not is better understood when analysed using constructivism. From sovereignty era 
to human rights era display the normative shift on is refereeing to. With the inception of the 
Charter, Article 2 (4) intensified the non-intervention doctrine. Due to the non-intervention 
doctrine states used sovereignty to defend themselves in cases they are alleged of Human Rights 
violations. However, with the rise of Human Rights Law there was a significance change in 
international law in relation to humanitarian intervention. This change in law has been also 
effected by the state practice and opinio juris. This prominence of international humanitarian 
intervention brought about scepticism to its detractors. They are sceptical of the possible 
manipulation and abuse of emerging international humanitarian intervention doctrine. Even 
today, this doctrine has not been endorsed, however, there is in indication that it might come as 
an exception to the current rule. 
 
 
It is one‟s view that the above proposed approach is likely to strike a balance between the need 
for human rights protection and the quest to minimize the use of force in the international 
relations. If the recent developments like the one in Kosovo present the turning point in the 
international community, then the new law allowing for a degree of humanitarian intervention 
might be emerging. The best way to achieve such mission is to amend the U.N. Charter; 
however, this is also the most difficult route to take. Several of the above proposed solutions are 
troublesome for the reasons discussed above. The latter proposal can be arguably to be in 
conformity with the Charter on the following basis: it promotes human rights and it implicitly 
gets U.N. authority. 
 
As noted above, since the end of Cold War there has been a shift towards strict international 
human rights law accompanied by harsher enforcement measures. This changing of norms of  
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Intervention is evident clearly on Post-Cold War period. The justifications for the intervention in 
Somalia for example are not the same as those in Kosovo. What was unacceptable during the 
Cold War is now unacceptable. Norms which intervention takes place evolves not just static. 
However, there has been no authorization for the third party to stop the violation of these human 
rights using force. In line with this, NATO intervention in Kosovo was never authorized or 
approved by the U.N. Security Council as a result its legality is still problematic. This 
intervention revealed the underdevelopment of the law in relation to morality. It further 
uncovered the failure of the international law to bring about equilibrium between states‟ 
prerogatives and citizen‟s rights. While one might argue that the intervention was morally just 
given the then violation on human rights, but it created a bad precedent. If this precedent is really 
going to be followed then it likely to leave a room for superpowers to use force for purposes 
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